To cut to the chase, the skimmer exfiltrates data via a POST request to the same domain name where the JavaScript is loaded from. The skimmerĪs mentioned previously, the skimmer is quite opaque and makes debugging effort difficult and lengthy. We can now see the purpose of this script: it is to load the proper skimmer. It is best to either use an already compromised site or bypass the check for the address bar (onestepcheckout).
#How much is malwarebytes premium code#
One way to understand what the code does is by using a debugger and setting a breakpoint at a particular spot. It is injected inline within the DOM right before the text/x-magento-init tag or separated by copious amounts of white space. The loader is also an encoded piece of JavaScript that is somewhat obscure. However, in the majority of cases we found it loaded externally. This skimmer can be found loaded directly into compromised e-commerce sites. It has a variety of features, the most peculiar may be the secondary keylogger it uses to try and defend against inspection. Thanks to some data from I've come across a new(?) digital skimmer/ #magecart I call "q-logger". The code is dense and using an obfuscator that is as generic as can be, making identification using signatures challenging. Depending on how much you enjoy parsing JavaScript you may have a love/hate relationship with it. This skimmer was originally flagged by Eric Brandel as q-logger. But it wasn’t until we started digging further that we realized how much bigger it was.
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Case in point, one particular skimmer identified as q-logger, has been active for several months. In a blog post about Magecart Group 8, we documented some of the various web properties used to serve skimmers and exfiltrate stolen data.īut at the end of the day, we only know about attacks that we can see, that is until we discover more. For instance, the different threat actors are continuing to expand and diversify their methods and infrastructure. This is certainly true if we only look at recent newsworthy attacks indeed when a victim is a large business or popular brand we typically are more likely to remember it.įrom a research standpoint, we have observed certain shifts in the scope of attacks. This blog post was authored by Jérôme SeguraĪlthough global e-commerce is continuing to grow rapidly, it seems as though Magecart attacks via digital skimmers have not followed the same trend.